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EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT REGULATION OF NEW SHARING 
ECONOMY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES 
The Sharing Economy has developed quickly. As with most new 
developments, such as the internet, legislation and regulation lag far be-
hind these advancements. As the sharing economy has developed, gov-
ernments are realizing the need for regulation. Conflicts have arisen be-
tween individuals, other companies, and regulating governments. The 
primary question is how to either fit the sharing economy companies like 
Uber into existing regulations, or how to create new regulations govern-
ing these companies that will benefit society the most.  
Governments throughout the world are attempting to answer this 
question with very different results. This paper will begin by looking at 
the quick development of the sharing economy. The second section of 
the paper will discuss the conflicts generated specifically by the sharing 
economy as it relates to transportation network companies (TNCs) as 
well as policy concerns. The third section of this paper will analyze the 
laws and regulations in different countries to determine how these coun-
tries have answered the question of how to regulate TNCs. It will con-
clude with a discussion of the theory of law and economics, and how the 
most efficient regulation of TNCs may not be consistent worldwide.  
I. THE SHARING ECONOMY 
“Over the past few years, the sharing economy has matured from a 
fringe movement into a legitimate economic force . . . .”1 It is remarkable 
how quickly the sharing economy has developed. What is more remarka-
ble is how quickly our society has accepted it as a part of our lives. For 
most of us, five years ago we would not have considered jumping into a 
stranger’s personal car for a ride, staying at a stranger’s house in their 
spare room, or even dropping our dogs off at a stranger’s house for the 
weekend. But these are the kinds of things that have become, if not yet 
“normal,” at least accepted.2  
Companies like Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and DogVacay, connect indi-
viduals with others to share resources, time, and services in exchange for 
a fee. “The Sharing Economy is a socio-economic ecosystem built 
around the sharing of human and physical resources. It includes the 
  
 1. Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other, 
WIRED.COM (Apr. 23, 2014 6:30 AM), www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/. 
 2. Id. 
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shared creation, production, distribution, trade and consumption of goods 
and services by different people and organisations.”3  
The sharing economy differs from time-shares, car pools, and bed 
and breakfasts because technology has increased the ease of sharing and 
decreased transaction costs.4 The increased use of cell phones, comput-
ers, and the internet has improved and significantly broadened access to 
resources, making it easier and less costly to share. Electronic payment 
systems have made it easier to exchange money. Along with technologi-
cal advancements has come increased willingness to rely on others’ rat-
ings and reviews as a proxy for first-hand knowledge of quality and 
trustworthiness, but this has not always been the case. 
As the sharing economy began gaining ground, people were skepti-
cal. Many people are still skeptical about trusting strangers with their 
personal belongings, homes, and even pets. “That skepticism reflects a 
widely held, deeply ingrained attitude reinforced by decades of warnings 
about poisoned Halloween candy and drink-spiking pickup artists.”5 Tra-
ditional transactions with strangers in stores, restaurants, and even taxi-
cabs are “undergirded and supported by a complicated series of regula-
tions, backstops, and assurances that go back to the Industrial Revolu-
tion.”6 These types of regulations and assurances do not yet exist for the 
sharing economy.7 
During a time when our communities were so small that everyone 
knew everyone else, there was an incentive to treat everyone well or risk 
getting a bad reputation.8 Over the years the population has grown and 
people are less likely to know everyone in their community, which de-
creased the incentive to treat everyone well. As a result, trust in our 
neighbors and people we do business with also decreased.9 Technologi-
cal advances have created a system of reviews and ratings that “make[] it 
easy to spot lousy drivers, bathrobe-pilferers and surfboard-wreckers.” 10 
This system serves as a proxy for trust. The prospect of receiving a poor 
review provides an incentive to behave in an appropriate way or risk not 
being able to engage in future transactions. This allows people to rely on 
the representations of other people and creates a sense of trust. Platforms 
  
 3. Benita Matofska, What is the Sharing Economy?, THEPEOPLEWHOSHARE.COM (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/. 
 4. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.  
 5. Tanz, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 4. 
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that allow reviews and ratings to be posted by both parties to a transac-
tion increase this sense of trust.11 
Despite the lack of governing regulation and assurances, the sharing 
economy is a cultural and economic breakthrough that benefits society in 
profound ways.12 It has widespread economic, environmental, and social 
benefits.13 Executives of sharing economy companies recognize these 
benefits and society’s need for them.14 
The sharing economy provides economic benefits to individuals by 
empowering them and enabling a more equal distribution of power.15 
“As more [people] stitch together a flexible work schedule, more start-
ups have emerged in the sharing economy space.”16 The sharing econo-
my allows owners to “make money from underused assets” and allows 
renters to pay less for using those assets than if they purchased them or 
used a taxi or hotel.17 This arrangement is mutually economically benefi-
cial. 
Environmental benefits result from a more efficient use of re-
sources.18 For example, using a ride share service or “renting a car when 
you need it, rather than owning one, means fewer cars are required and 
fewer resources must be devoted to making them.”19 Not owning a car 
also encourages use of public transportation, cycling, and walking, which 
reduce pollution from vehicle emissions. 
Social benefits of the sharing economy include more “active citi-
zens, deeply engaged in their communities and in the development of the 
environments they live and work in.”20 The sharing economy also pro-
motes a culture that is less focused on the individual and more focused 
on the benefits to the community and the greater good.21 Sociable people 
benefit from meeting new people.22 
  
 11. Id. 
 12. Tanz, supra note 1. 
 13. Matofska, supra note 3. 
 14. Tanz, supra note 1 (“No wonder some of the loftier sharing-economy executives see their 
mission as not just building a business but fundamentally rewiring our relationships with one anoth-
er. Much as the traditional Internet helped strangers meet and communicate online, they say, the 
modern Internet can link individuals and communities in the physical world.”). 
 15. Matofska, supra note 3. 
 16. Kate Rogers, Uber Drivers’ Suit Given Class Action Status, CNBC (Sept. 2 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/02/uber-drivers-suit-given-class-action-status.html.  
 17. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 4 (“Airbnb says hosts in San Francisco who 
rent out their homes do so for an average of 58 nights a year, making $9,300. Car owners who rent 
their vehicles to others using RelayRides make an average of $250 a month; some make more than 
$1,000.”). 
 18. Matofska, supra note 3. 
 19. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 4. 
 20. Matofska, supra note 3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 4. 
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Although the sharing economy offers many benefits, it also has 
some negative impacts. While the sharing economy provides economic 
benefits to some people, it creates financial hardship for others. Services 
provided through platforms like Airbnb and Uber take business away 
from existing, highly regulated companies like hotel and taxi compa-
nies.23 This competition has contributed to the atomization of the labor 
market. “To stay alive economically, you must be prepared to switch 
careers and employers often. Atomization means much less personal 
security and a constant need to stay current in what you do.”24  
II. EXISTING REGULATION MISFIT FOR SHARING ECONOMY 
The idea behind the sharing economy is an equitable sharing by in-
dividuals, rather than the inequitable system of large corporations getting 
disproportionately wealthier while individuals only improve their situa-
tion marginally. Governments have enacted regulations to protect the 
consumer. Similarly, regulations exist to protect employees who are vul-
nerable to being taken advantage of by employers. These regulations do 
not fit well in the more equitable system of the sharing economy. For 
example, a cab company is strictly regulated to ensure drivers are not 
required to work too many hours by a powerful employer. In contrast, 
drivers for a TNC control when and where they work. They are not at 
risk of being abused or taken advantage of in the same way as an em-
ployee is.  
Another example of how taxi regulations do not fit TNCs is in in-
spection requirements. In New York, taxis are required to return to the 
garage. An inspector can make a single trip to inspect a taxi company’s 
vehicles at the garage. The inspection process for TNCs would be more 
complicated. Drivers use their personal vehicles. Inspectors cannot make 
a single trip to inspect all of the vehicles operated through the TNC, and 
locating the vehicles would be more difficult and time-consuming. The 
problem that society is facing now is how to create regulation and assur-
ances to prevent or reduce the negative impact of the sharing economy 
without eliminating the benefits. 
III. UBER TECHNOLOGIES BUSINESS MODEL EXAMPLE 
Typical of a sharing economy company, Uber connects individuals 
with other people who can provide a needed service.25 Through the Uber 
  
 23. Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, 
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cab-companies-unite-against-uber-and-
other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html. 
 24. David L. Birch, The Atomization Of America, INC.COM (Mar. 1, 1987), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/19870301/524.html. 
 25. While Uber provides different services under different brands, this article refers to the 
Uber business model in a general sense. The Uber app that has caused the most conflict with the taxi 
market in the European Union is UberPop, which, like the Uber app that is used in the United States, 
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app, a person who needs a ride is connected with someone who is willing 
to give them a ride in their personal vehicle.26 Because Uber is not a taxi 
company, but individuals offering rides in their personal vehicles, it is 
not subject to the strict regulations that taxis must abide by. As a result, 
Uber drivers are able to offer their services at lower rates. This lack of 
regulation and lower rates has caused unfair competition concerns 
amongst taxi companies.  
To begin driving for Uber, drivers must apply to Uber to be able to 
use their app, must pass a background check, and their vehicle must pass 
an inspection.27 Uber designed these requirements to alleviate concerns 
about public safety. Additionally, Uber provides liability insurance while 
the driver has a passenger in the car. 
Drivers are never required to drive a certain amount and do not 
work according to any schedule. Uber claims to simply be a platform for 
drivers and riders to connect and it does not employ the drivers who use 
their app.28 This creates flexibility and freedom for drivers, but has 
caused employment concerns.   
IV. POLICY CONCERNS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
With new developments and advances come risks, conflicts, and 
policy concerns. Some of the policy concerns with ride-sharing services 
are unfair competition for highly regulated taxi companies, public safety 
issues, labor and employment issues, insurance and liability concerns, tax 
issues, and the desire to continue encouraging innovation and advance-
ment. Some countries place different priorities on these issues and there-
fore regulations for TNCs like Uber look very different from country to 
country. 
a. Unfair Competition 
The policy concern that has made the most headlines worldwide re-
cently is unfair competition. The people who are most affected by the 
startup of TNCs are taxi drivers. TNCs provide the same service as a 
taxi, a ride from point A to point B, often at a cheaper rate. Additionally, 
the method of hiring a TNC using a mobile phone app is often much 
more convenient for riders. The savings in time and money by using a 
TNC means that more people are using them instead of hailing a tradi-
tional taxi on the street, or calling a dispatch office. 
  
depends on private drivers. FILIPA AZEVEDO & MARIUSZ MACIEJEWSKI, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
BRIEFING: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF UBER AND SIMILAR 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES (TNCS) 5 (2015) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/563398/IPOL_BRI(2015)563398_EN.pd
f. 
 26. Ben Edelman, Assessing Uber: Competition and Regulation in Transportation Networks, 
BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.benedelman.org/news/112415-1.html. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Rogers, supra note 16. 
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This new competition threatens the livelihood of cab drivers, many 
of which have spent years and large amounts of money preparing for and 
building their business. Cab drivers in most countries are highly regulat-
ed. This means that they often have to spend a lot of time preparing for 
and passing various practical skill and knowledge tests. In London, taxi 
drivers must pass “The Knowledge.”29 This test is one of the most diffi-
cult in the world and takes the average person two to four years to com-
plete.30 The test requires the driver “to memorise every possible route 
through the city as well as memorising landmarks and points of interest, 
museums, parks, police stations, churches, theatres and schools and not 
just the famous landmarks like Buckingham Palace and Nelson’s Col-
umn.”31 In contrast, TNCs can operate in London without drivers passing 
the same rigorous tests. TNC drivers use GPS devices to navigate rather 
than the memorized information required to pass the Knowledge. In 
places like New York, cab drivers operate in a medallion system.32 This 
kind of system requires cab drivers to have a valid medallion to operate a 
taxicab.33 These medallions are limited in number and often extremely 
expensive.34 TNCs on the other hand are not limited in the same way.35 
Cab drivers who have invested so much time and money in their 
livelihood are not seeing the return on their investment that they had 
hoped for and need. TNCs are threatening their livelihood and cab driv-
ers throughout the world have been very vocal about the unfair competi-
tion of TNCs. Cab drivers in various countries are staging protests and 
demonstrations.36 Some of these demonstrations are peaceful and simply 
cause trouble by destroying any flow of traffic.37 Others have become 
violent, involving the destruction of property and physical injury.38 
  
 29. THE KNOWLEDGE TAXI - LONDON KNOWLEDGE, http://www.theknowledgetaxi.co.uk (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2015)  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Jeff Horwitz & Chris Cumming, Taken for a Ride, SLATE.COM (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/06/taxi_medallions_how_new_york_s_terrib
le_taxi_system_makes_fares_higher_and_drivers_poorer_.html. 
 33. Scott Beyer, How to Solve the Uber vs Taxi Conflict? Medallion Reform, FORBES (May 8, 
2015, 9:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/05/08/how-to-solve-the-uber-vs-taxi-
conflict-medallion-reform/. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. See Ben McPartland, Taxis Versus Uber Battle Turns Ugly in France, THELOCAL.FR 
(June 23, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.thelocal.fr/20150623/taxi-versus-uber-battle-in-france-turns-
ugly; Darren Boyle, Black Cab Drivers Bring Central London to a Standstill in Protest at TfL Li-
censing Hundreds of New Minicabs Every Week as Calls Grow for a Crackdown of Apps like Uber, 
DAILYMAIL.COM (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3255282/Black-cab-
drivers-bring-central-London-standstill-protest-TfL-licensing-hundreds-new-minicabs-week-calls-
grow-crackdown-apps-like-Uber.html; Frustration Escalates as Toronto Taxi Drivers Stage Mass 
Uber Protest, THEGLOBEANDMAIL.COM (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/taxi-drivers-clog-toronto-streets-in-mass-uber-
protest/article27658787/. 
 37. Boyle, supra note 36.  
 38. McPartland, supra note 36.  
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These demonstrations are bringing to light the disparate regulations gov-
erning taxicabs and TNCs.  
b. Public Safety – Background Checks, Insurance Regulations & Liabil-
ity 
Cab drivers in most countries must pass a background check in ad-
dition to passing skill and knowledge tests in order to begin operating a 
taxi. TNCs do not have the same requirements for skill and knowledge 
tests, but like Uber, may require at least a basic background check.39 
There are concerns that TNCs like Uber do not require drivers to pass 
background checks frequently enough.40 However, the primary concern 
is that these background checks do not actually protect the public as in-
tended. Some people argue that these background checks are not exten-
sive enough.41 This concern stems from situations where drivers harm 
passengers. For example, in India an Uber driver kidnapped and raped a 
female passenger.42 In the US, an Uber driver attempted to burglarize a 
passenger’s home after dropping her off at the airport.43 
Insurance requirements and liability are another public safety con-
cern. Cab companies and drivers in most countries are subject to strict 
labor regulations and insurance requirements. Because TNCs are not 
taxicabs, they do not have to meet these same requirements.44 The prob-
lem arises when there is a gap in insurance coverage, leaving people with 
very little recourse in the case of injury.45  
Insurance companies are very specific about when coverage kicks 
in. Since TNC drivers use their personal vehicles, unless the company 
provides insurance, the driver, passengers, and third parties rely on the 
driver’s insurance.46 For example, in the United States, states require 
liability insurance.47 However, “[a]s with most forms of insurance, the 
insurer defines the terms under which it will assume liability, subject to 
state limitations.”48 If an individual is using a personal vehicle to 
transport people for a fee, and the services are available to the public, an 
  
 39. Edelman, supra note 26. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. India Uber Driver Guilty of Rape, BBC (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-34578477. 
 43. Noelle Phillips, Denver Uber Driver Charged with Attempted Burglary of Passenger's 
Home, DENVER POST, Apr. 6, 2015, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27859912/denver-uber-driver-charged-attempted-burglary-
passengers-home. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J. 
L. TECH. & ARTS 329, 336 (2015). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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insurance company can exclude coverage while the vehicle is being used 
for that purpose.49  
There are four periods of liability exposure.50 The first period is 
when the driver uses the vehicle for personal use with the app turned off 
and not enabled.51 The second period is when the app is enabled, but the 
driver “has not yet accepted a ride request.”52 The third period is when 
the “driver has accepted a ride request . . . and is in transit to the passen-
ger.”53 The final period is when the passenger is in the car.54 If injury 
occurs, courts will have to determine during which of these periods the 
services become available to the public.55  
A gap in insurance coverage occurs when neither the TNC’s insur-
ance nor the driver’s private insurance covers injury or loss.56 For exam-
ple, a six year old girl was killed when an Uber driver hit her with his car 
while she was crossing the street.57 He had the app on and was looking 
for ride requests when the incident happened.58 Initially Uber took the 
stance that the driver did not have a passenger in the car, and therefore 
was “not working for the company at the time. But amid widespread 
criticism over its response to . . . questions about its insurance policies, a 
few months later the company announced it would cover drivers who had 
the app activated but had not yet accepted a ride.”59 
c. Labor Regulations 
Along with the difficulties caused for taxicab drivers and the threat 
to their livelihood come some negative impacts for TNC drivers. Taxi 
companies in most countries classify their drivers as employees and are 
subject to labor law regulations. However, TNCs do not classify drivers 
as employees, and therefore escape these labor law regulations.60 This 
has a significant impact on drivers. Issues such as not making minimum 
wage, not having the option to enroll in health insurance through an em-
ployer, and no worker compensation benefits are the most significant 
problems with not classifying drivers as employees. 
  
 49. Hilary Rowen & Kara DiBiasio, The Insurance Coverage Implications of Using a Cell 
Phone App to Hail a Ride, 44 BRIEF 12, 14 (2015). 
 50. Id. at 13. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 14. 
 56. Loucks, supra note 45. 
 57. Family of 6-Year-Old Girl Killed by Uber Driver Settles Lawsuit, ABC7NEWS.COM (July 
14, 2015), http://abc7news.com/business/family-of-6-year-old-girl-killed-by-uber-driver-settles-
lawsuit/852108/. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Rogers, supra note 16. 
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Employers (in most developed countries) are required to pay their 
employees a minimum wage. This ensures that employees make enough 
money to live. TNC drivers are not employees and so do not have a 
guarantee of making at least a minimum wage. Driving their own per-
sonal vehicles means that they are responsible for the expense of buying 
fuel, maintaining the vehicle, cleaning the vehicle, and the depreciation 
due to use and mileage. Some drivers do not make enough money by 
driving for a TNC to cover these expenses and still make a living wage. 
In addition to not making a living wage, drivers are responsible for 
providing their own health insurance. In some countries, this is a costly 
expense that drivers cannot afford.  
In some countries, worker compensation covers employees in the 
case of injury or illness. However, independent contractors do not re-
ceive this same benefit. This means that if driving for a TNC is the only 
source of income for an individual, they may be unable to pay bills and 
buy necessities, including insurance, if they are injured while driving and 
they fall in the insurance gap discussed above.  
Some drivers believe they should be classified as employees, and 
should receive the benefits and protections afforded to employees.61 For 
example, Uber drivers in San Francisco filed a class action lawsuit 
against Uber, claiming that Uber treats them “like employees without 
offering benefits, and avoiding costs associated with payroll taxes.”62 
The judge denied Uber’s motion for summary judgment because “the 
drivers perform a service that benefits the company, which presumably 
makes them employees under California law and subject to the state’s 
labor code.” However, a jury will ultimately decide whether drivers are 
employees “by considering whether Uber has the right to control the 
manner and means of the service.”63 The primary appeal to TNC drivers 
is flexibility.64 Some speculate that most drivers do not rely on driving 
for Uber as a primary source of income, but drive for Uber as a way to 
supplement their income.65 If California decides that it should classify 
Uber drivers as employees, they would lose this flexibility.66 “[T]hey 
would have set shifts, earn a fixed hourly wage, and be unable to use 
other ridesharing apps.”67 
  
 61. Rogers, supra note 16. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Tricia Gorman, Uber Drivers in California Can Pursue Unpaid Tips as a Class, 30 
WESTLAW JOURNAL EMPLOYMENT 4 (2015). 
 64. Uber's Landmark Legal Case Just Got Even Bigger, THEWEEK.CO.UK (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/uber/58491/uber-black-cabs-fight-back-with-new-app. 
 65. Interview with anonymous Uber driver (Dec. 15, 2015).  
 66. Uber's Landmark Legal Case Just Got Even Bigger, supra note 64.  
 67. Id.  
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d. Tax 
An issue tied to the concern of labor regulations is employment tax. 
Employers in the United States are required to pay payroll tax.68 These 
taxes contribute to Social Security and Medicare.69 The amount of mon-
ey contributed to Social Security for each employee “is directly correlat-
ed with the amount an employee can expect to receive through Social 
Security upon retirement or disability.”70 By not classifying drivers as 
employees, they will not receive the benefits of these payroll taxes upon 
retirement. Income tax reporting requirements for employers also would 
not apply to TNCs, making it possible for drivers to evade income tax.  
Additionally, it is uncertain how TNCs should be taxed. For exam-
ple, taxis in New York City pay sales tax, a per ride surcharge to the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), city road tax, medallion 
licensing fees, and corporate tax.71 In contrast, Uber does not pay the 
surcharge to the MTA, road tax, or medallion licensing fees.72 As TNCs 
reduce taxi business, the income from these taxes and surcharges de-
creases. This can cause a problem for cities that rely on these taxes for 
revenue to improve infrastructure such as road and bridge maintenance. 
This lost revenue is difficult to replace. 
e. Innovation 
Innovation is “a path to long-term economic growth, a word of hope 
for economic recovery in times of crisis, and a vital opportunity for 
economies . . . to maintain high levels of competitiveness.” 73 Most gov-
ernments prioritize the advancement of innovation but do not always 
succeed in promoting it. Well-intentioned regulations to allow or regulate 
TNCs have the potential to advance or impede innovation. 74 The concern 
with creating new regulations to severely limit or prohibit TNCs is that 
this stifles innovation and prevents advancement.  
Legislation by nature is a slow moving process. Innovation on the 
other hand “moves at the speed of sound: it can ‘happen’ anywhere and 
anytime.”75 This difference in pace often results in legislation lagging far 
behind innovation, as is the case for TNCs. To remedy this problem, 
innovation needs either to slow or stop as legislation catches up, or new 
  
 68. Understanding the Purpose of Payroll Taxes, LAWS.COM (last visited Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://tax.laws.com/payroll-tax/payroll-tax-purpose 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ron Sherman, Yellow Cabs vs. Uber: Tale of the Tax Tape, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ron-sherman-yellow-cabs-uber-tale-tax-tape-
article-1.2338390. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation-Friendly Regulation: the Sunset of Regulation, the Sunrise 
of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 201 (forthcoming). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
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regulations need to be flexible to allow for innovation as technology ad-
vances very quickly. However, flexibility is difficult to achieve when 
legislators are still responding to the last crisis. The European Union is 
experiencing this difficulty as countries respond to the crisis, with very 
different results.  
V. REGULATION OF TNCS 
European Union countries have very different approaches to the 
conflicts and policy concerns surrounding TNCs. Uber has been in the 
news recently for actions in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Spain. Recently, the European Union has been asked to determine what 
the appropriate solution is to the unfair competition problem between 
TNCs and taxicabs.76 The European Union has not yet given an answer 
to this question. In the meantime, European Union countries are doing 
their best to regulate TNCs without violating European Union law. This 
same disparity in regulations can be seen within the United States. Some 
governments have chosen to allow TNCs by either applying existing 
regulations or creating new ones. Others have chosen to ban TNCs alto-
gether.  
a. Allowing TNCs 
i. New regulation 
Colorado was the first state in the United States to specifically le-
galize TNCs through legislation.77 Colorado enacted the Transportation 
Network Company Act in June 2014.78 This law allows TNCs to operate 
legally by obtaining permits from the Public Utilities Commission.79 
Under the law, TNCs are required to carry at least one million dollars in 
liability insurance.80 TNCs or TNC drivers are also required to carry 
primary insurance during the insurance gap period discussed above.81 In 
addition to addressing the insurance requirements, the law addresses pub-
lic safety concerns by requiring that the vehicle be inspected for safety 
by a TNC inspector or certified mechanic.82 It also requires that drivers 
provide proof that they are medically fit to drive, prohibits drivers from 
providing services for more than twelve consecutive hours, requires zero 
tolerance of driving while under the influence of intoxicating substances, 
and requires drivers to provide a background check.83 “[P]rivate compa-
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nies that use publicly available data” can do these background checks, 
which is a less thorough background check than the one required for taxi 
drivers who “are subject to fingerprint background checks performed by 
the Federal and Colorado Bureaus of Investigation.”84 The Public Utili-
ties Commission issued rules in November 2015 to elaborate and clarify 
the requirements under the Transportation Network Company Act.85 The 
Colorado government prioritized innovation and advancement by specif-
ically allowing these companies to operate legally, but attempted to craft 
laws that would protect the public.  
California was the first state in the United States to legalize TNCs 
through common law. Following the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion (CPUC) decision in 2013, TNCs can legally operate within the 
state.86 Since this decision, California has seen a rise in conflicts con-
cerning Uber and has passed legislation similar to Colorado’s in order to 
address some of these conflicts, primarily public safety, insurance, and 
discrimination against people with disabilities. There are concerns that 
Uber continuously and intentionally refuses to abide by the law.87 Be-
cause its actions are seen as intentionally flouting the law, in July 2015 a 
CPUC judge recommended that Uber be suspended from operating in 
California and be fined $7.3 million for noncompliance.88 California is 
known as a state that promotes advancements through innovation, but 
recent cases demonstrate that even an innovative state like California will 
protect vulnerable people and will not take kindly to scofflaws. 
ii. Applying existing regulation  
The United Kingdom has answered the question of how to regulate 
TNCs by declaring them legal businesses as long as they operate within 
existing law.89 The United Kingdom has specific regulations governing 
taxicabs. Its laws are also very specific about what TNCs are allowed to 
do and how they can look.90 TNCs are not allowed to use taximeters, 
they cannot be hailed on the street, and they cannot look like the tradi-
tional black cabs.91 Recently, Transport For London (TFL) has claimed 
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that Uber’s app is a taximeter and simulates hailing a cab on the street.92 
The mayor of London accused Uber of “systematically breaking the 
law.”93 However, the High Court ruled that the app does not simulate 
hailing a cab on the street and is not a taximeter.94 TFL claims to wel-
come the ruling as well, stating, “[T]here had been ‘significant public 
interest in establishing legal certainty in the matter.’”95 In addition to 
advancing the value of certainty, the United Kingdom government wel-
comes “disruptive technology,” valuing innovation highly despite the 
fact that the mayor is trying to restrict TNCs.96 Rather than focusing on 
public safety, the conflict in the United Kingdom appears to be focused 
on unfair competition and protecting traditional taxicabs.  
b. Banning TNCs 
Delhi banned Uber after Uber failed to perform an adequate back-
ground check and a driver raped a female passenger.97 Germany has 
completely banned most TNC models of business that utilize the mobile 
app. The country has a well-regulated market and consumer protections 
in place, making it virtually impossible for Uber to operate.98 “The Ger-
man society values consumer protection, safety and training. Uber inter-
prets this as ‘difficult market conditions’. But as a matter of fact, these 
conditions apply to every company in Germany, radio taxis and taxi 
drivers operate accordingly.”99 Germany also values order, consistency, 
and certainty. Thus, fewer people are willing to flout laws and utilize 
Uber, making it difficult for Uber to continue operating in Germany 
while the app is banned. 
In other European countries, Uber continues to operate despite bans 
on its apps.100 France and Spain have also banned Uber.101 The bans on 
Uber in France and Spain are effected by overly burdensome laws, such 
as requiring drivers to return to a parking lot or their base in between 
rides, minimum pricing, and not allowing them to drive around while 
looking for passengers.102 Uber has filed complaints with the European 
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Court of Justice, requesting that the court overturn the laws banning Uber 
in Germany, France, and Spain because they are “a patchwork of Euro-
pean taxi regulations that protect established taxi companies from new 
competitors.”103 In the European Union, countries have the freedom to 
regulate transportation companies because transportation regulations are 
exempt from the European Union services directive.104 The European 
Commission will also address the issue in guidelines that it is set to issue 
next year.105 The guidelines will include how the European Union should 
deal with the sharing economy; they will “include more powers to guar-
antee consumers' protection,” and simplified VAT regulations.106  
VI. ECONOMIC EFFICIENT REGULATION 
An economic approach to law is based on the notion of efficien-
cy.107 “Pareto efficiency” represents an allocation of resources in which 
no party can be made better off without making someone else worse 
off.108 A Pareto Improvement occurs when two people are made better by 
a transaction.109 If there are no trades in resources that two people could 
make so that both would obtain a higher overall welfare, those two par-
ties are already at a Pareto optimal position and there are no more “win-
win” trades.110 The optimum allocation of resources is not attained so 
long as it is possible to improve the position of at least one individual 
while keeping everyone else as well off as they were before.111 The 
economist Ronald Coase said that people will naturally find themselves 
in this type of Pareto efficient situation as long as they have freedom of 
contract, perfect information, and no transaction cost.112 If these three 
things exist, then the content of the law does not matter.113 
For freedom of contract to exist, “the bargain must be struck on the 
basis of freedom and equality,” a completely level playing field.114 To 
have perfect information a person would have to be omniscient. “Parties 
must possess full and accurate knowledge about their own values and 
preferences, the other parties’ values and preferences, and all aspects of 
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the world they inhabit. Everything must be completely transparent and 
fully understood.” 115  Zero transaction costs exist when there are no 
costs to identifying willing parties with whom to transact, negotiating the 
transaction, obtaining information, executing the agreement, and enforc-
ing the agreement.116 In addition to money, costs include time, effort, and 
energy. 
Since we do not live in a world where freedom of contract, perfect 
information, and no transaction costs exist, the content of the law actual-
ly matters.117 To attain the most efficient outcome, the law should reflect 
what we would have traded or negotiated for if we lived in the Pareto 
utopian world.118 It is difficult, and often impossible to achieve the opti-
mum outcome. This can be particularly true when trying to regulate a 
new and unknown phenomenon like the sharing economy and specifical-
ly TNCs. It is even possible that what is most economically efficient for 
one country is not economically efficient for the rest of the world.  
The first step in deciding what the law should be is deciding who 
should have a voice in the decision. This requires determining who the 
interested parties to a transaction are. When it comes to TNCs, there are 
four primary groups of interested parties: (1) TNCs, (2) TNC drivers, (3) 
taxi drivers, and (4) consumers and the public.  
Two methods are used when deciding what the content of the law 
should be to reflect what the parties would have negotiated in that hypo-
thetical world. These two approaches are the empirical and rational actor 
approaches. The empirical method looks empirical data, including the 
preferences of the people affected by the decision. Empirical data is 
gathered by asking interested parties what their views and preferences 
are. This can be done through surveys and analyzing historical data. This 
can often be a daunting or impossible task if it is too costly in terms of 
time and resources, if the interested parties are too numerous to survey, 
or if it is not possible to locate or determine the identity of all of the in-
terested parties. If it is an impossible task, the empirical data can also be 
gathered by looking to similarly situated parties, members of relevant 
communities, or surrogates for the parties.  
The rational actor approach requires stating assumptions about what 
rationality entails and what rational actors would prefer. There are two 
different methods for the rational actor approach. These are the wealth 
maximization and behavioral economic approaches.119 The first method 
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assumes that people are only interested in maximizing monetary gain.120 
The second considers other hard-to-measure factors such as compassion, 
environmental justice, and integrity.121 
The rational actor approach will necessarily place a priority on 
some preferences while disregarding others. As rational actors, TNCs are 
primarily concerned with wealth maximization. Consumers and the pub-
lic value safety, cheap transportation, and the freedom to choose. TNC 
drivers and taxi drivers are also interested in wealth maximization, but 
there are other behavioral economic factors that these parties value. For 
example, taxi drivers are concerned with making a living. Perhaps they 
can increase potential income by adapting and evolving to look more like 
TNCs. This may increase income while also decreasing transactional 
costs by using an app to identify and accept nearby fares quickly, and by 
implementing a more efficient system for collecting payment. However, 
in some countries like the United Kingdom, where taxi drivers have 
spent years preparing to pass the knowledge, adapting to look like TNCs 
may not best represent their interests. Patience, hard work, and the in-
vestment of time and money to attain an iconic position may outweigh 
the wealth maximization potential. On the other hand, people (including 
taxi drivers) generally think innovation and advancement are good things 
so banning TNCs altogether would not be the most economically effi-
cient outcome for society as a whole. As long as safety measures exist, 
having the option of taking a taxi or an Uber may be a primary interest 
for consumers. For the United Kingdom, keeping taxis very distinct from 
TNCs may be the most efficient outcome possible for all parties. 
In contrast, United States TNC conflicts focus more on public safety 
and employment. If becoming a taxi driver in the United States takes less 
time and does not hold the same status as becoming a cab driver in Lon-
don, taxi drivers will be more open to adapting and evolving to looks like 
TNCs. In the United States, the taxi industry is more likely to be viewed 
as an “out of date, heavily unionized, and overbearingly regulated indus-
try.”122 TNC drivers in the United States may be more open to additional 
regulation requiring insurance and other mechanisms to provide public 
safety because more and more public safety is becoming a priority for 
our society over wealth maximization. In the United States the most effi-
cient outcome is more likely to be a balance between conservatively de-
regulating taxis to allow them to stay competitive with TNCs, while also 
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increasing regulations for TNCs to ensure public safety and to address 
employment concerns.123  
Germany, France, and Spain have all chosen to ban Uber. Taking 
into account all of the benefits of the sharing economy, it is difficult to 
believe that banning TNCs is an efficient outcome for any country. Ra-
ther than reflecting a careful consideration of the interests of all parties, it 
suggests strong protectionist motives. Interestingly, France has not 
banned other sharing economy type businesses, further adding to this 
suspicion.124  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The sharing economy will continue to grow and this will continue to 
be a challenge for regulators. As governments are scrambling to address 
the crisis created by TNCs, they will likely look to other governments to 
see how they have handled the situation. While there are common 
threads of conflict surrounding TNCs, looking at the challenges from a 
behavioral economics evaluation shows that values and priorities in dif-
ferent parts of the world may necessarily lead to differing legislation 
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